Responsible Disclosure Policies
29 September 2022 | 3:00 pm

Recently, Uber was completely pwned, apparently by an 18-year-old. Simon Sharwood's Uber reels from 'security incident' in which cloud systems seemingly hijacked provides some initial details:
Judging from screenshots leaked onto Twitter, though, an intruder has compromised Uber's AWS cloud account and its resources at the administrative level; gained admin control over the corporate Slack workspace as well as its Google G Suite account that has over 1PB of storage in use; has control over Uber's VMware vSphere deployment and virtual machines; access to internal finance data, such as corporate expenses; and more.
And in particular:
Even the US giant's HackerOne bug bounty account was seemingly compromised, and we note is now closed.

According to the malware librarians at VX Underground, the intruder was using the hijacked H1 account to post updates on bounty submissions to brag about the degree of their pwnage, claiming they have all kinds of superuser access within the ride-hailing app biz.

It also means the intruder has access to, and is said to have downloaded, Uber's security vulnerability reports.
Thus one of the results of the incident is the "irresponsible disclosure" of the set of vulnerabilities Uber knows about and, presumably, would eventually have fixed. "Responsible disclousure" policies have made significant improvements to overall cybersecurity in recent years but developing and deploying fixes takes time. For responsible disclosure to be effective the vulnerabilities must be kept secret while this happens.

Stewart Baker points out in Rethinking Responsible Disclosure for Cryptocurrency Security that these policies are hard to apply to cryptocurrency systems. Below the fold I discuss the details.

Baker summarizes "responsible disclosure":
There was a time when software producers treated independent security research as immoral and maybe illegal. But those days are mostly gone, thanks to rough agreement between the producers and the researchers on the rules of “responsible disclosure.” Under those rules, researchers disclose the bugs they find “responsibly”—that is, only to the company, and in time for it to quietly develop a patch before black hat hackers find and exploit the flaw. Responsible disclosure and patching greatly improves the security of computer systems, which is why most software companies now offer large “bounties” to researchers who find and report security flaws in their products.

That hasn’t exactly brought about a golden age of cybersecurity, but we’d be in much worse shape without the continuous improvements made possible by responsible disclosure.
Baker identifies two fundamental problems for cryptocurrencies:
First, many customers don’t have an ongoing relationship with the hardware and software providers that protect their funds—nor do they have an incentive to update security on a regular basis. Turning to a new security provider or using updated software creates risks; leaving everything the way it was feels safer. So users won’t be rushing to pay for and install new security patches.
Users have also been deluged with accounts of phishing and other scams involving updating or installing software, so are justifiably skeptical of "patch now" messages. In fact, most users don't even try to use cryptocurrency directly, but depend on exchanges. Thus their security depends upon that of their exchange. Exchanges have a long history of miserable security, stretching back eight years to Mt. Gox and beyond. The brave souls who do use cryptocurrency directly depend on the security of their wallet software, which again has a long history of vulnerabilities.

Next, Baker points to the ideology of decentralization as a problem:
That means that the company responsible for hardware or software security may have no way to identify who used its product, or to get the patch to those users. It also means that many wallets with security flaws will be publicly accessible, protected only by an elaborate password. Once word of the flaw leaks, the password can be reverse engineered by anyone, and the legitimate owners are likely to find themselves in a race to move their assets before the thieves do.
Molly White documents a recent example of both problems in Vulnerability discovered in vanity wallet generator puts millions of dollars at risk:
The 1inch Network disclosed a vulnerability that some of their contributors had found in Profanity, a tool used to create "vanity" wallet addresses by Ethereum users. Although most wallet addresses are fairly random-looking, some people use vanity address generators to land on a wallet address like 0xdeadbeef52aa79d383fd61266eaa68609b39038e (beginning with deadbeef), ... However, because of the way the Profanity tool generated addresses, researchers discovered that it was fairly easy to reverse the brute force method used to find the keys, allowing hackers to discover the private key for a wallet created with this method.

Attackers have already been exploiting the vulnerability, with one emptying $3.3 million from various vanity addresses. 1inch wrote in their blog post that "It’s not a simple task, but at this point it looks like tens of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency could be stolen, if not hundreds of millions."

The maintainer of the Profanity tool removed the code from Github as a result of the vulnerability. Someone had raised a concern about the potential for such an exploit in January, but it had gone unaddressed as the tool was not being actively maintained.
It is actually remarkable that it took seven months from the revelation of the potential vulnerability to its exploitation. And the exploits continue, as White reports in Wintermute hacked for $160 million:
Wintermute hasn't disclosed more about the attack, but it's possible that the hacker may have exploited the vulnerability in the vanity wallet address generator Profanity, which was disclosed five days prior. The crypto asset vault admin had a wallet address prefixed with 0x0000000, a vanity address that would have been susceptible to attack if it was created using the Profanity tool.
But everything is fine because the CEO says the company is "solvent with twice over that amount in equity left". Apparently losing one-third of your equity to a thief is no big deal in the cryptosphere.

Baker describes rapid exploitation of such vulnerabilities as "nearly guaranteed" because of the immediate financial reward, and provides two more examples from last month:
In one, hackers took nearly $200 million from Nomad, a blockchain “bridge” for converting and transferring cryptocurrencies. One user began exploiting a flaw in Nomad’s smart contract code. That tipped others to the exploit. Soon, a feeding frenzy broke out, quickly draining the bridge of all available funds. In the other incident, Solana, a cryptocurrency platform, saw hackers drain several million dollars from nearly 8,000 wallets, probably by compromising the security of their seed phrases, thus gaining control of the wallets.
Baker summarizes:
Together, these problems make responsible disclosure largely unworkable. It’s rarely possible to fill a security hole quietly. Rather, any patch is likely to be reverse engineered when it’s released and exploited in a frenzy of looting before it can be widely deployed. (This is not a new observation; the problem was pointed out in a 2020 ACM article that deserves more attention.)

If I’m right, this is a fundamental flaw in cryptocurrency security. It means that hacks and mass theft will be endemic, no matter how hard the industry works on security, because the responsible disclosure model for curing new security flaws simply won’t work.
Böhme et al Fig. 2
The 2020 paper Baker cites is Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure in Cryptocurrencies by Rainer Böhme, Lisa Eckey, Tyler Moore, Neha Narula, Tim Ruffing and Aviv Zohar. The authors describe the prevalence of vulnerabilities thus:
The cryptocurrency realm itself is a virtual "wild west," giving rise to myriad protocols each facing a high risk of bugs. Projects rely on complex distributed systems with deep cryptographic tools, often adopting protocols from the research frontier that have not been widely vetted. They are developed by individuals with varying level of competence (from enthusiastic amateurs to credentialed experts), some of whom have not developed or managed production-quality software before. Fierce competition between projects and companies in this area spurs rapid development, which often pushes developers to skip important steps necessary to secure their codebase. Applications are complex as they require the interaction between multiple software components (for example, wallets, exchanges, mining pools). The high prevalence of bugs is exacerbated by them being so readily monetizable. With market capitalizations often measured in the billions of dollars, exploits that steal coins are simultaneously lucrative to cybercriminals and damaging to users and other stakeholders. Another dimension of importance in cryptocurrencies is the privacy of users, whose transaction data is potentially viewable on shared ledgers in the blockchain systems on which they transact. Some cryptocurrencies employ advanced cryptographic techniques to protect user privacy, but their added complexity often introduces new flaws that threaten such protections.
Böhme et al describe two fundamental differences between the disclosure and patching process in normal software and cryptocurrencies. First, coordination:
the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies, which must continuously reach system-wide consensus on a single history of valid transactions, demands coordination among a large majority of the ecosystem. While an individual can unilaterally decide whether and how to apply patches to her client software, the safe activation of a patch that changes the rules for validating transactions requires the participation of a large majority of system clients. Absent coordination, users who apply patches risk having their transactions ignored by the unpatched majority.

Consequently, design decisions such as which protocol to implement or how to fix a vulnerability must get support from most stakeholders to take effect. Yet no developer or maintainer naturally holds the role of coordinating bug fixing, let alone commands the authority to roll out updates against the will of other participants. Instead, loosely defined groups of maintainers usually assume this role informally.

This coordination challenge is aggravated by the fact that unlike "creative" competition often observed in the open source community (for example, Emacs versus vi), competition between cryptocurrency projects is often hostile. Presumably, this can be explained by the direct and measurable connection to the supporters' financial wealth and the often minor technical differences between coins. The latter is a result of widespread code reuse, which puts disclosers into the delicate position of deciding which among many competing projects to inform responsibly. Due to the lack of formally defined roles and responsibilities, it is moreover often difficult to identify who to notify within each project. Furthermore, even once a disclosure is made, one cannot assume the receiving side will act responsibly: information about vulnerabilities has reportedly been used to attack competing projects, influence investors, and can even be used by maintainers against their own users.
The second is controversy, which:
emerges from the widespread design goal of "code is law," that is, making code the final authority over the shared system state in order to avoid (presumably fallible) human intervention. To proponents, this approach should eliminate ambiguity about intention, but it inherently assumes bug-free code. When bugs are inevitably found, fixing them (or not) almost guarantees at least someone will be unhappy with the resolution. ... Moreover, situations may arise where it is impossible to fix a bug without losing system state, possibly resulting in the loss of users' account balances and consequently their coins. For example, if a weakness is discovered that allows anybody to efficiently compute private keys from data published on the blockchain, recovery becomes a race to move to new keys because the system can no longer tell authorized users and attackers apart. This is a particularly harmful consequence of building a system on cryptography without any safety net. The safer approach, taken by most commercial applications of cryptography but rejected in cryptocurrencies, places a third party in charge of resetting credentials or suspending the use of known weak credentials.
I discussed the forthcoming ability to "efficiently compute private keys" in The $65B Prize.

Böhme et al go on to detail seven episodes in which cryptocurrencies' vulnerabilities were exploited. In some cases disclosure was public and exploitation was rapid, in other cases the developers were informed privately. A pair of vulnerabilities in Bitcoin provides an example:
a developer from Bitcoin Cash disclosed a bug to Bitcoin (and other projects) anonymously. Prior to the Bitcoin Cash schism, an efficiency optimization in the Bitcoin codebase mistakenly dropped a necessary check. There were actually two issues: a denial-of-service bug and potential money creation. It was propagated into numerous cryptocurrencies and resided there for almost two years but was never exploited in Bitcoin. ... The Bitcoin developers notified the miners controlling the majority of Bitcoin's hashrate of the denial-of-service bug first, making sure they had upgraded so that neither bug could be exploited before making the disclosure public on the bitcoin-dev mailing list. They did not notify anyone of the inflation bug until the network had been upgraded.
The authors conclude with a set of worthy recommendations for improving the response to vulnerabilities, as Baker does also. But they all depend upon the existence of trusted parties to whom the vulnerability can be disclosed, and who are in a position to respond appropriately. In a truly decentralized, trustless system such parties cannot exist. None of the recommendations address the fundamental problem which, as I see it, is this:
  • Cryptocurrencies are supposed to be decentralized and trustless.
  • Their implementations will, like all software, have vulnerabilities.
  • There will be a delay between discovery of a vulnerability and the deployment of a fix to the majority of the network nodes.
  • If, during this delay, a bad actor finds out about the vulnerability, it will be exploited.
  • Thus if the vulnerability is not to be exploited its knowledge must be restricted to trusted developers who are able to ensure upgrades without revealing their true purpose (i.e. the vulnerability). This violates the goals of trustlessness and decentralization.
This problem is particularly severe in the case of upgradeable "smart contracts" with governance tokens. In order to patch a vulnerability, the holders of governance tokens must vote. This process:
  • Requires public disclosure of the reason for the patch.
  • Cannot be instantaneous.
If cryptocurrenceies are not decentralized and trustless, what is their point? Users have simply switched from trusting visible, regulated, accountable institutions backed by the legal system, to invisible, unregulated, unaccountable parties effectively at war with the legal system. Why is this an improvement?

Cryptocurrency-enabled Crime
22 September 2022 | 3:00 pm

Robin Wigglesworth's An anatomy of crypto-enabled cyber crime points to An Anatomy of Crypto-Enabled Cybercrimes by Lin William Cong, Campbell R. Harvey, Daniel Rabetti and Zong-Yu Wu. They write in their abstract that:
Assembling a diverse set of public, proprietary, and hand-collected data including dark web conversations in Russian, we conduct the first detailed anatomy of crypto-enabled cybercrimes and highlight relevant economic issues. Our analyses reveal that a few organized ransomware gangs dominate the space and have evolved into sophisticated firm-like operations with physical offices, franchising, and affiliation programs. Their techniques also have become more aggressive over time, entailing multiple layers of extortion and reputation management. Blanket restrictions on cryptocurrency usage may prove ineffective in tackling crypto-enabled cybercrime and hinder innovations. But blockchain transparency and digital footprints enable effective forensics for tracking, monitoring, and shutting down dominant cybercriminal organizations.
Wigglesworth comments:
Perhaps. But while it is true that blockchain transparency might enable arduous but effective analysis of crypto-enabled cyber crime, reading this report it’s hard not to think that the transparency remedy is theoretical, but the costs are real.
I have argued that the more "arduous but effective analysis" results in "tracking, monitoring, and shutting down" cybercriminals, the more they will use techniques such as privacy coins (Monero, Zcash) and mixers (Tornado Cash). Indeed, back in January Alexander Culafi reported that Ransomware actors increasingly demand payment in Monero:
In one example of this, DarkSide, the gang behind last year's Colonial Pipeline attack, accepted both Monero and Bitcoin but charged more for the latter because of traceability reasons. REvil, which gained prominence for last year's supply-chain attack against Kaseya, switched to accepting only Monero in 2021.
Below the fold I discuss both Cong et al's paper, and Erin Plante's $30 Million Seized: How the Cryptocurrency Community Is Making It Difficult for North Korean Hackers To Profit, an account of Chainalysis' "arduous but effective" efforts to recover some of the loot from the Axie Infinity theft.

Cong et al argue that:
A one-size-fits-all solution, such as restricting or banning cryptocurrency usage by individuals or organizations is problematic for three major reasons. First, this is not a national problem. Blockchains exist across multiple countries and harsh regulations in a particular country or jurisdiction have little or no effect outside that country. As we have seen from other global initiatives (e.g., carbon tax proposals), it is nearly impossible to get global agreement. Second, while an important problem, cryptocurrency plays a small role in the big picture of illegal payments. Physical cash is truly anonymous and, indeed, this may account for the fact that 80.2% of the value of U.S. currency is in $100 notes. It is rare the consumers use $100 bills and it is equally rare that retailers are willing to accept them. Third, and most importantly, expunging all cryptocurrency use in a country eliminates all of the benefits of the new technology. Even further, it puts the country at a potential competitive disadvantage. For example, a ban on crypto effectively eliminates both citizens and companies from participating in web3 innovation.
I would counter:
  1. The goal of cybercrime is not to amass cryptocurrency but fiat. Doing so involves organizations such as exchanges and banks that do respond to OFAC sanctions. The goal should be to ban the on- and off-ramps, making converting large amounts of cryptocurrency into fiat extremely difficult, risky and expensive.
  2. It is true that physical cash has excellent anonymity. But experts in illegal payments, such as drug smugglers, currently prefer cryptocurrency to cash as being more secure and more portable.
  3. This is the tell. Arguments in favor of cryptocurrencies always end up touting mythical future benefits such as "web3 innovation" to distract from the very large and very real negative externalities that they impose right now on everyone outside the crypto-bros in-group.
Nevertheless, the paper is the more interesting as not being the product of cryptocurrency skeptics.

Cong et al divide the crimes they study into two groups:
In the first, hackers exploit weaknesses in either centralized organizations such as crypto-exchanges or decentralized algorithms, using this to siphon out cryptocurrency. For example, Mt. Gox, a Japanese crypto-exchange, was the victim of multiple attacks—the last one in 2014 led to loss of almost 850,000 bitcoins ($17b at the time of writing). In these types of attacks, coins are transferred to a blockchain address. Given that these transactions and addresses do not require real names, the attackers are initially anonymous. Indeed, the exploit is available for anyone to see given that the ledger of all transactions is public here. While the original exploit is completely anonymous (assuming the address has not been used before), the exploiter needs to somehow “cash out.” Every further transaction from that address is also public, allowing for potential deployment of blockchain forensics to track down the attacker.
It is the fact that it is practically almost impossible, and theoretically unsafe, to purchase real goods with cryptocurrency that forces cybercriminals to "cash out" to fiat. Thus the need for regulators to crack down on on- and off-ramps.

They describe the second group thus:
Beyond stealing cryptocurrency via exchange and protocol exploits, traditional cybercriminal activities are now also enabled with a new payment channel using the new technology—the second opportunity our research focuses on. The use of cryptocurrencies replaces potentially traceable wire transfers or the traditional suitcase of cash, and is popular for extortion. Criminal organizations also use cryptocurrencies to launder money. According to Europol, criminals in Europe laundered approximately $125b in currency in 2018 and more than $5.5 billion through cryptocurrencies. The increasing cryptocurrency adoption also facilitates many other forms cybercrimes.
Again, the authors undercut their argument against regulation by acknowledging the advantages cryptocurrencies have over "the traditional suitcase of cash". Although Cong et al briefly survey these two groups, they conclude that:
As of April 2022, Ransomware leads BTC payments with (42.5%), followed by Other (45.7%), and Bitcoin Tumbler (6.9%). If Other is excluded, Ransomware dominates cybercrime-related bitcoin activity with 86.7% of the total BTC payments.
In light of these issues, the remainder of the article delves deeper into the economics of ransomware, the most threatening and consequential form of crypto-enabled cybercrime, to provide insights relevant for digital asset owners and investors, as well as regulatory agencies and policymakers.
Their detailed analysis of ransomware groups' business models and operations is fascinating and well worth study. But here I want to focus on their proposal for how to combat the scourge; chain analysis. They write:
While addresses are anonymous initially, funds are often transferred from one address to another in order to “cash out.” All transactions are viewable and immutable - a key feature of blockchain technology. This opens the possibility of deploying forensic tools with a focus on tracking, monitoring, and identifying the crypto transactions attributed to criminals. Indeed, our research provides a glimpse of what is possible given the transparent nature of blockchains.
Erin Plante's $30 Million Seized: How the Cryptocurrency Community Is Making It Difficult for North Korean Hackers To Profit provides more than a "glimpse of what is possible, albeit not about ransomware but the latest fashion in cyrptocurrency theft:
One of the most troubling trends in crypto crime right now is the stunning rise in funds stolen from DeFi protocols, and in particular cross-chain bridges. Much of the value stolen from DeFi protocols can be attributed to bad actors affiliated with North Korea, especially elite hacking units like Lazarus Group. We estimate that so far in 2022, North Korea-linked groups have stolen approximately $1 billion of cryptocurrency from DeFi protocols.
Plante is celebrating Chainalysis' recebt success:
With the help of law enforcement and leading organizations in the cryptocurrency industry, more than $30 million worth of cryptocurrency stolen by North Korean-linked hackers has been seized. This marks the first time ever that cryptocurrency stolen by a North Korean hacking group has been seized, and we’re confident it won’t be the last.
The seizures represent approximately 10% of the total funds stolen from Axie Infinity (accounting for price differences between time stolen and seized), and demonstrate that it is becoming more difficult for bad actors to successfully cash out their ill-gotten crypto gains. We have proven that with the right blockchain analysis tools, world-class investigators and compliance professionals can collaborate to stop even the most sophisticated hackers and launderers.
The details are interesting but it appears that this success was enabled by regulatory action:
However, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) recently sanctioned Tornado Cash for its role in laundering over $455 million worth of cryptocurrency stolen from Axie Infinity. Since then, Lazarus Group has moved away from the popular Ethereum mixer, instead leveraging DeFi services to chain hop, or switch between several different kinds of cryptocurrencies in a single transaction.
Why did OFAC sanctions cause Lazarus Group to avoid Tornado Cash? It is clearly not because they were worried that sanctions would apply to them. They worried that the exchanges they need to use to "cash out" would be penalized for accepting coins trackable to one of Tornado Cash's sanctioned wallets. The exchanges need access to the global banking system to accept and distribute fiat, and that access would be at risk if they traded with a Tornado Cash wallet. Note that this would be a "strict liability" offence, so ignorance would be no excuse.

Not wishing to rain on Chainalysis' parade, but $30M is 3% of the $1B that Chainalysis estimates North Korean groups have stolen from DeFi so far this year, and 0.3% of the running total at Molly White's Web3 is going just great. Plante notes:
Much of the funds stolen from Axie Infinity remain unspent in cryptocurrency wallets under the hackers’ control. We look forward to continuing to work with the cryptocurrency ecosystem to prevent them and other illicit actors from cashing out their funds.
There is clearly a long way to go before claiming that it is "Difficult for North Korean Hackers To Profit", let alone cyber criminals more generally. Despite all the focus on the blockchain, it is clear that the key vulnerability of cyber criminals is their need eventually to convert cryptocurrency into fiat. This was, for example, the undoing of Ilya Lichtenstein and Heather Morgan. Increasing regulation and its enforcement on the cryptocurrency on- and 0ff-ramps is essential.

White House Statement On Cryptocurrency Regulation
20 September 2022 | 3:00 pm

The White House issued a statement entitled Following the President’s Executive Order, New Reports Outline Recommendations to Protect Consumers, Investors, Businesses, Financial Stability, National Security, and the Environment describing the state of the policy development process to which I contributed twice:
The nine reports submitted to the President to date, consistent with the EO’s deadlines, reflect the input and expertise of diverse stakeholders across government, industry, academia, and civil society. Together, they articulate a clear framework for responsible digital asset development and pave the way for further action at home and abroad. The reports call on agencies to promote innovation by kickstarting private-sector research and development and helping cutting-edge U.S. firms find footholds in global markets. At the same time, they call for measures to mitigate the downside risks, like increased enforcement of existing laws and the creation of commonsense efficiency standards for cryptocurrency mining. Recognizing the potential benefits and risks of a U.S. Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), the reports encourage the Federal Reserve to continue its ongoing CBDC research, experimentation, and evaluation and call for the creation of a Treasury-led interagency working group to support the Federal Reserve’s efforts.
Below the fold I describe some of the details of this "framework", which unfortunately continues to use the misleading "digital asset" framing.

The framework addresses seven areas:
  1. Protecting Consumers, Investors, and Businesses. This area involves directing regulatory agencies to "aggressively pursue investigations and enforcement actions against unlawful practices" and consumer protection agencies to "monitor consumer complaints and to enforce against unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices". Alas, it fails to come down against the cryptocurrency lobbyists pushing the CFTC to be the regulator instead of the SEC.
  2. Promoting Access to Safe, Affordable Financial Services. This area recognizes the need to compete with "digital assets" by "adoption of instant payment systems, like FedNow, by supporting the development and use of innovative technologies by payment providers to increase access to instant payments, and using instant payment systems for their own transactions". It is ridiculuous that I can transfer money in the UK in minutes, but in the US it takes many days so the banks can feast on the float.
  3. Fostering Financial Stability. This area directs the Treasury to "work with financial institutions to bolster their capacity to identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities" and work internationally to identify systemic risks. Clearly, intrernational cooperation is needed, especially to rein in Binance.
  4. Advancing Responsible Innovation. This area is the inevitable sop to the cryptocurrency industry's peddling of the innovation meme about a system which simply repikcates existing financial products without the necessary regulation.
  5. Reinforcing Our Global Financial Leadership and Competitiveness. This area encourages agencies to work internationally to increase "collaboration with—and assistance to—partner agencies in foreign countries through global enforcement bodies". But, alas, it also directs the Commerce Department to "help cutting-edge U.S. financial technology and digital asset firms find a foothold in global markets for their products". Pro tip: you can't have it both ways.
  6. Fighting Illicit Finance. This area suggests needed legislative actions, and is based upon input from:
    Treasury, DOJ/FBI, DHS, and NSF drafted risk assessments to provide the Administration with a comprehensive view of digital assets’ illicit-finance risks. The CFPB, an independent agency, also voluntarily provided information to the Administration as to risks arising from digital assets. The risks that agencies highlight include, but are not limited to, money laundering; terrorist financing; hacks that result in losses of funds; and fragilities, common practices, and fast-changing technology that may present vulnerabilities for misuse.
    Sanctioning Tornado Cash is a good start, but in the end the miscreants need exchanges to "cash out", so taking action against exchanges that accept coins tainted by Tornado Cash is the next important step.
  7. Exploring a U.S. Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). This area directs the Treasury to "lead an interagency working group to consider the potential implications of a U.S. CBDC, leverage cross-government technical expertise, and share information with partners". The US doesn't actually need a CBDC of the kind they're considering. A combination of FedNow and reviving postal banking (dormant since 1967) would do the trick.
Regulation of cryptocurrencies in the US is coming, albeit too slowly. Much of the progress reported here is worthy, especially considering the vast resources lobbying to defeat or water it down.

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